Education-Development Interlinkages (Part XX)
Does the spread of education help to improve governance?
Q&A with Santhakumar V | 23 Jan 2026
There could be different theoretical reasons for the positive impact of education on governance. One could be the potential role of the middle class in strengthening democracy and governance, and the role that education plays in the creation of such a class.

Q. Does education empower citizens to be active in democracy and make governments accountable?
A: There are multiple channels through which education impacts/shapes citizenship and democracy, and hence, governance. There could be a role of education in creating awareness of the rights of every individual. It is noted that the spread of education enhances civic participation and political involvement. Education enhances the willingness to vote in elections in the developed world, as evident from studies in the UK and the USA. There is also a positive relationship between education and 15 out of 16 indicators of group memberships (barring trade-union membership). Such a relationship was also evident in the USA regarding church attendance. Hence, this relationship may indicate that education facilitates participation in social forums of different kinds.
Several studies have hypothesised, or shown empirically, a high correlation between education and democracy across countries. A review can be seen in Glaeser et al (2007)1. Barro and Lee (2001)2 could see in a study of 91 countries, a higher correlation coefficient between the years of schooling and an index of polity, indicating that schooling leads to democracy (and there is no evidence that democracy leads to schooling). There are arguments of a similar nature in different disciplines of social sciences. However, there are also studies, such as Acemoglu et al (2005)3, which see no connection between education and democracy after controlling for the fixed effects of countries arising from geography or culture.
Milligan et al (2004)4 saw that the higher level of educational attainment was related positively to several measures of political interest and involvement in both these countries. The relationship between education and voting was found to be strong in the USA, but not in the UK. However, the results in the UK became somewhat similar when registration rules were controlled.
Q. So, there is a connection between education and civic participation. Could you explain this?
A: Glaeser et al (2007)5 have analysed this problem theoretically. They have a specific characterisation of democracy and dictatorship, where the former has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. However, a dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. In this context, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting. According to them, education raises the benefits of civic engagement. Or it raises the participation in support of a broad-based regime (democracy) relative to that in support of a narrow-based regime (dictatorship). Based on this view, education may encourage successful democratic revolutions against dictatorships. One can use this framework to argue that even if such a democratic revolution does not take place, dictatorial states may become more responsive to the rights or concerns of the wider public as the majority gets the benefit of education.
Q. Has the increased civic and political participation of educated people led to support for democracy or dictatorship?
A: Different scholars have noted the participation of students in several pro-democratic movements throughout history. However, students had also participated in anti-Semitic riots in Bavaria in 1819 and supported Mussolini and Hitler. These and the fact that there was support for communist leaders, like Che Guevara, in Latin America, may lead to the conclusion that though educated people participate in political and collective action, it may not always be for (or to sustain) democracy.
Educated leaders of the communist parties have established dictatorial regimes in different parts of the world. However, in all these cases where the engagement of the educated has led to some form of dictatorship, there is an element of ‘social’ or ‘mass dictatorship’. Hence, these were against the states captured by the elites or minorities who were perceived as ‘enemies’ of society at large. I have argued that certain transformations, like the capture of the state by the underclass, should be seen as part of the long-run deepening of democracy, even though some of these may lead to a dictatorship of underclass parties.6 In that way, the participation of the educated in these movements has to be seen as a resistance to a certain real or perceived concentration of power/wealth in the hands of the established sections of society.
The spread of education had coincided with popular uprisings against the elite rulers in different parts of the world. This was visible if we understand the history of England, the Netherlands, France, Germany or Italy. The role of the urban middle class (which included the beneficiaries of education) in supporting democratisation has been noted in countries like Argentina, Brazil, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Spain, Peru, and Ecuador in the late 1970s and 1980s. There is an argument that the democratisation of South Korea and Taiwan after 1987 was closely linked to the growth of the middle class there. Such a trend is yet to be seen in China. The middle class in China may fear that a movement towards democracy could lead to political chaos, upsetting their financial success. They saw the experience of Russia in 1990s when/where the sudden transition to democracy led to the capture of public resources by a few people and poverty and miserable living conditions for the majority. The Chinese may want to avoid such a scenario in their country.
Q. What about the connection between education and democracy in India?
A: The early studies on Indian elections saw a correlation (based on aggregated data) between development variables, such as literacy and electoral turnout (for a review, see Kondo, 20077). However, the role of education has decreased gradually with time. This may imply that people with limited literacy have also started participating actively in elections. Since the 1990s, caste has become the most salient factor in determining voters’ preferences in India. This, too, may indicate the acceleration of the electoral participation of people at large (and not only the educated ones; there may not be more than 20 percent of people in India in the late 80s who could be called educated then). Hence, later studies, like Yadav (2004)8, demonstrated that the level of education is not significant in explaining voter-party differences in India.
The weak relationship between education and political participation in India could be because education was limited to a minority. Nearly 50 percent of students in the school-going age did not complete schooling even in 2014. Such a skewed distribution of education may have implications for political behaviour. Education was limited to the elites at the beginning of the country’s democratic life, and these people may have participated in elite-controlled politics. However, their enthusiasm may have declined as the less-educated started participating in politics mainly through identity-based (caste-based) social/political mobilisations. The role of education in middle-class-driven politics, visible in the developed world discussed in the previous paragraphs, is yet to evolve in a significant manner in most parts of India.
Q. Does the spread of education or the creation of an educated class lead to a situation where the rulers are compelled to enhance transparency, improve governance and reduce corruption?
A: There could be different theoretical reasons for the positive impact of education on governance. One could be the potential role of the middle class in strengthening democracy and governance, and the role that education plays in the creation of such a class. It has been argued by a long stream of scholars that the middle class has an incentive to work towards better governance.9 Political scientists and sociologists have argued that a strong middle class is necessary to deepen and sustain democracy. This class demands greater representation in, and accountability from, governments.
However, there could be some interesting differences in the role of the middle class in contemporary developing societies. First, one can see not only the middle-class but the poor and other vulnerable groups (like lower caste groups, working-class, marginalised ethnic groups) playing an important role in the deepening of democracy. The emergence of middle- or lower-caste political movements and their capturing of power in Indian states are examples. The competition between elite-controlled and anti-elite political formations, or between different anti-elite movements, may lead to the strengthening of democracy. These need not lead to a more transparent or less corrupt state, as evident from states like UP or Bihar. However, the deepening of a democracy (anti-elite assertion and the emergence of competitive politics) could lead to a higher level of distribution of public resources to the poor. This seems to have a positive impact on human development, as evident from the experience of Kerala and Tamil Nadu (and other states like Andhra Pradesh, later).
The middle class may be playing a role in improving governance and reducing corruption. One argument in support of this is that the monopoly in economic activities arising out of the collusion between the political class and the richer sections (or capitalists) could become costly for the middle class, given their endowments and disadvantages. The arrival of such a class to a significant political position may lead to increased pressure to improve governance. Such a class can come to exist through the spread of education. The anti-elite movements and associated competition in politics may be leading to higher investments and other support (like mid-day meal programmes) for education, and this may lead gradually to the emergence of a significant share of the population as the middle class. This, in India, first occurred in Kerala, where there was an anti-elite capture of the state and real competition in politics. This was followed in Tamil Nadu.
Regarding the empirical evidence of the proposition that the middle class impacts governance, there is general evidence linking institutional performance and the (substantial) presence of educated people in the country. This is true for the degree of democracy, political freedom, respect for property rights, absence of corruption, or efficiency in the provision of public services.10
Q. Does the educated middle class have an impact on governance in India?
A: There are not many systematic studies in this regard. However, there is anecdotal evidence from specific Indian states as given in Santhakumar (2014). It notes the emergence of an anti-elite movement and immediate transition to a strongly competitive democracy, which has led to the spread of education and the creation of a middle class in Kerala, much before the other Indian states. There are indications that the middle class influences electoral outcomes and governance in Kerala. The middle class or their issues, like infrastructure and corruption, have an important role in determining electoral outcomes in Delhi. However, the situation in other parts of India is different.
Though there has been a substantial growth of the middle class in India as a whole, after the 90s, their share in the entire population may not be more than 10 – 15 percent. Moreover, they are spread all over the country and in certain cases concentrated in cities that have hinterlands populated mostly by the poor and vulnerable sections of society. The emergence of 10 – 15 percent of the national population as the middle-class all over India would mean that corruption could become an important issue in national discourse (especially in the English-speaking media), but is yet to become a serious issue to vote out politicians in many parts of India.
Q. Can the spread of education strengthen formal institutions like the judiciary or the rule of law?
A: Social behaviour and the allocation of resources are governed by informal norms and formal institutions. Norms are enforced by communities or social groups, and formal institutions (including laws and legal systems) are sanctioned by the state. Education enhances the mobility of people from one group to another, and it may lead to a lesser dependence on the norms of specific communities. Adherence to community norms could work against education in certain cases. For example, it is one factor that works against girls’ education in different parts of the world.
Higher levels of education may lead to a greater dependence on formal institutions. This is a desirable change since such institutions are more likely to depend on values that cut across different communities. In certain contexts, formal institutions are likely to be those which negotiate between or go beyond the differing perspectives of relatively smaller groups. This may push the formal institutions much closer to a universal set of values, and hence, could be shaped by the global discourses on individual freedom and human rights. On the other hand, community norms, while ensuring certain cooperation within the community, may sanction exclusion or violence against others. Hence, a movement away from such community norms is desirable if it can be achieved through education. Education encourages people to internalise a generalised social trust (rather than community loyalty). Helliwell and Putnam (2007)11 could see, based on two large surveys held in the US, that the education of self and average education (in society) both lead to a significant increase in social trust. They could not find any evidence to show that an increase in average education has any negative effect on social participation.
Q. Does the spread of education help meritocracy (and reduce the importance of social privileges)?
A: The relationship between education, meritocracy and democracy is discussed in the literature (Arrow, Bowles & Durlauf 200012). Education is expected to promote equality of opportunity, and inequality, if any, sustained by education (or meritocracy) has certain social legitimacy. This is so since educational attainment and performance determine the so-called ‘merit’, and it is seen as a transparent way to achieve socio-economic mobility. Such a meritocracy is compatible with the needs of a just society. This is so since it rejects the arbitrary domination by aristocracy, birth or inheritance. Meritocracy and democracy are ‘acceptable’ since these enhance the ‘status’ of a person according to their ability, effort and virtue and collectively determined freedom and rights. However, what if this meritocracy itself is determined by one’s own birth into a specific family?
It has been noted that access to and performance in higher education in the US is strongly influenced by social class, despite the fact that opportunities have increased for a relatively small share of the population belonging to lower socio-economic groups (Arrow, Bowles & Durlauf, 2000). Hence, children with parents belonging to higher socio-economic groups are likely to have access to a wider range of academic support and opportunities. The factors that are found to be influencing educational outcomes include the presence of both parents in the family, being the child of a father who is highly educated, interacting with peers and family members who value education and higher achievement in this regard and having access to a variety of math and science courses (McNamee and Miller, 200913). Therefore, it is somewhat obvious that a person’s educational achievement is determined by the educational status of their family or social environment.
However, the role of education in enhancing the equality of opportunity in India could be undermined since nearly half of the students do not complete schooling. They are more likely to come from socially and economically less-privileged backgrounds (Santhakumar et al, 2016). They do not have access to higher education or educated employment.
In summary, education, in theory, has the potential to enhance equality of opportunity (for higher education) and employment. However, the evidence is mixed. Even in a developed country like the USA, social mobility facilitated through education is mediated through the socio-economic background of the family. This could be much more so in India.
About the author:
Santhakumar V is a former Professor, Azim Premji University, Bengaluru
Featured image by Koshu Kunii on Unsplash
Endnotes:
Glaeser, E.L., Ponzetto, G.A.M. & Shleifer, A. 2007. Why does democracy need education? J Econ Growth 12, 77–99.↩︎
Glaeser, E.L., Ponzetto, G.A.M. & Shleifer, A. 2007. Why does democracy need education? J Econ Growth 12, 77–99.
Barro R., Lee J.-W. 2001. International data on educational attainment: Updates and implications. Oxford Economic Papers, 53, 541–563.↩︎
Barro R., Lee J.-W. 2001. International data on educational attainment: Updates and implications. Oxford Economic Papers, 53, 541–563.
Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J., Yared P. 2005. From Education to Democracy. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. 95, 44–49.↩︎
Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J., Yared P. 2005. From Education to Democracy. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. 95, 44–49.
Milligan K., Moretti E., Oreopoulous P. 2004. Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the US and the UK. Journal of Public Economics. 88, 1667–1695.↩︎
Milligan K., Moretti E., Oreopoulous P. 2004. Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the US and the UK. Journal of Public Economics. 88, 1667–1695.
Glaeser, E.L., Ponzetto, G.A.M. & Shleifer, A. 2007. Why does democracy need education? J Econ Growth 12, 77–99.↩︎
Glaeser, E.L., Ponzetto, G.A.M. & Shleifer, A. 2007. Why does democracy need education? J Econ Growth 12, 77–99.
Santhakumar, V. 2014. The Roots of Ill Governance and Corruption, Sage, New Delhi.↩︎
Santhakumar, V. 2014. The Roots of Ill Governance and Corruption, Sage, New Delhi.
Kondo, Norio. 2007. Election Studies in India. Institute of Developing Economies: Discussion Paper no. 98.↩︎
Kondo, Norio. 2007. Election Studies in India. Institute of Developing Economies: Discussion Paper no. 98.
Yadav, Yogendra. 2004. The Elusive Mandate of 2004. Economic and Political Weekly, December 18.↩︎
Yadav, Yogendra. 2004. The Elusive Mandate of 2004. Economic and Political Weekly, December 18.
It started with Aristotle. The following quote of Aristotle, given in a number of references, could be an indication in this regard, ‘In all states, there are three sections of the community – the very well off, the very badly-off, and those in between. Seeing therefore that it is agreed that moderation and a middle position are best, it is clear that in the matter of possessions, to own a middling amount is best of all. This condition is most obedient to reason, and following reason is just what is difficult both for the exceedingly rich, handsome, strong, and well-born, and for the opposite, the extremely poor, the weak, and the downtrodden.’ Aristotle. Politics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1962), pp.171-173; A well-known modern proponent of a similar idea is Harrington Moore. According to him, ‘… a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy.’ Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World.(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. p. 418.↩︎
It started with Aristotle. The following quote of Aristotle, given in a number of references, could be an indication in this regard, ‘In all states, there are three sections of the community – the very well off, the very badly-off, and those in between. Seeing therefore that it is agreed that moderation and a middle position are best, it is clear that in the matter of possessions, to own a middling amount is best of all. This condition is most obedient to reason, and following reason is just what is difficult both for the exceedingly rich, handsome, strong, and well-born, and for the opposite, the extremely poor, the weak, and the downtrodden.’ Aristotle. Politics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1962), pp.171-173; A well-known modern proponent of a similar idea is Harrington Moore. According to him, ‘… a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy.’ Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World.(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. p. 418.
Some of these studies include Barro, R. 1999. Determinants of Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 107(S6):158-183; La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1999. The Quality of Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15(1): 222-279; Svensson, J. 2005. Eight Questions about Corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3): 19- 42; Treisman, D. 2000. The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study. Journal of Public Economics 76(3): 399-457.↩︎
Some of these studies include Barro, R. 1999. Determinants of Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 107(S6):158-183; La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1999. The Quality of Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15(1): 222-279; Svensson, J. 2005. Eight Questions about Corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3): 19- 42; Treisman, D. 2000. The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study. Journal of Public Economics 76(3): 399-457.
Helliwell, J., and Putnam, R. 2007. Education and Social Capital. Eastern Econ J 33, 1–19.↩︎
Helliwell, J., and Putnam, R. 2007. Education and Social Capital. Eastern Econ J 33, 1–19.
Arrow, K., Bowles, S., & Durlauf, S. 2000. Meritocracy and Economic Inequality. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.↩︎
Arrow, K., Bowles, S., & Durlauf, S. 2000. Meritocracy and Economic Inequality. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
McNamee, S. & Miller, R. 2009. The Meritocracy Myth. New York: Rowman & Littlefield↩︎
McNamee, S. & Miller, R. 2009. The Meritocracy Myth. New York: Rowman & Littlefield
