CHAPTER 3
An Analysis of the Concept of Education

One of the main purposes of this book is to arrive at a clear understanding of the concept of education and as a result be a better position to assess whether our schools are or are not educational institutions and to determine what can be done to improve them in their function as educational institutions. We have already seen in the previous discussion on the use of educational metaphors that it is very difficult to get a clear grip on the concept education. Though metaphors are somewhat helpful, they are perhaps more misleading than insightful. What is required is a full-scale conceptual analysis of the concept in line with our discussion in Chapter 1 of the philosopher’s role in attacking the question of meaning. So in this chapter we will be taking a very close look at R.S.Peters’ analysis, which represents the most rigorous and thoroughgoing analysis of the concept ever undertaken.

Several Uses of the Term ‘Education’
Some of the confusion regarding the term ‘education’ stems from the fact that there are several uses of the term that have arisen out of or apart from the central notion of education and have developed a life of their own. So in order to be true to the way in which the term ‘education’ is used (i.e., not to stipulate or legislate, but to report faithfully) one must take these usages into account. At least three distinct uses of education can be isolated, and we shall refer to them as E₁, E₂, and E₃.

The Sociological Use (E₁)
The sociological use of ‘education’ has been so called because it is typically the one used by sociologists in describing the child-rearing practices of a people or society. Such description will often include schooling practices (E₂), but need not do so. Some societies do not have formal schools; the children are ‘educated’ at father’s or mother’s side
or are nurtured and reared communally. They are ‘educated’ (acculturated, socialized) through processes ranging from apprenticeship modelling to formal didactic instruction. The important point to note is that this use of ‘education’ does not necessarily refer to formal schooling (the ‘institutional use’ referred to below as E2) nor to the achievement of general enlightenment (referred to below under E3). The emphasis is on practices of socializing the child into the extant culture. It matters not if the beliefs acquired are false or correct, if the practices and skills developed are or are not morally acceptable from a universalizable standpoint, nor if the outcome of the training and rearing process results in blind adherence to the doctrines and rituals of the cultural group. According to this use of the term ‘educated’, whoever is properly ‘acculturated’ (or socialized) is ‘educated’. The two terms are roughly synonymous. It is this use of the term ‘education’ which is employed in such expressions as ‘The education of Henry Adams’ or ‘Oliver Twist’s street education’. Reference is made to any shaping of mind and character by any means whatsoever. Unlike E3 (below) there is no reference to good character or legitimate means of socialization. The reference is to the description of the socializing practices or growing-up influences in the particular person’s life regardless of the positive or negative nature of those influences. The E1, (sociological) use course can represent a considerable overlap with ‘education’ when that refers specifically to those influences on a person stemming from formal schools or institutions.

The Institutional Use (E2)

The schooling or institutional use of the term ‘education’ straightforwardly represents reference to a person’s development as a result of influences from schools or other formal ‘educational’ institutions. Common parlance relies on this use in such expressions as, ‘How many years of education did you get?’ (How many years did you go to school?) or ‘I quit my job to continue my education’ (I quit my job to return to school or university.) or ‘All that education didn’t do me much good’ (Those years in school didn’t do me much good.). It is very common in ordinary speech to refer to whatever goes on in schools as education. However—and this is important to note—at the same time, with equally legitimate use and no doubt more significant meaning, the same people will use ‘education’ in a more profound and thoughtful sense when they say things like ‘I went to school all those years, but failed to get an education’, or ‘I gained a good education though I never went to school’. Here, reference is to a sense of ‘education’ which is neither E1 or E2; it is what we shall here call the ‘general enlightenment’ sense of education.
The ‘General Enlightenment’ Use (E₃)

When reference is made to ‘education’ as something that may or may not go on in schools (as in those uses just noted above) or may or may not result from socialization (E₁), what is being referred to is a particular kind of human achievement which is considered to be a most valuable development of mind characterized by knowledge and understanding. Such a nascent concept of education was already extant in early Greece and was referred to as *paedia*. It is the use that clearly allows one to argue that schools are or are not (should be or should not be) educational institutions. Such talk does not even make sense if ‘schooling’ and ‘education’ are considered to be synonymous; if, that is, E₂ and E₃ are collapsed. It is the use that permits one to say with sense that certain forms of socialization are (or are not) contributory to education. It is the use that clearly is central to any discussion of education which is not superficial, even if it is granted that peripheral uses of ‘education’, as in E₁ and E₂, are also legitimate, meaningful uses. It is the use that will concern us in the Peters analysis to follow and in the remainder of the book, particularly in the discussion of the justification of education in Chapter 10. What, then, more precisely is education in this general enlightenment sense? For a discussion of this we turn to the analysis of ‘education’ by R.S.Peters.

R.S.Peters’ Analysis of ‘Education’

*Preliminary Observations*

We do well to remind ourselves what the task before us is. In conceptual analysis the attempt is to elucidate a concept by making explicit the rules according to which the term functions in ordinary language. Some people find it helpful to think of this task in terms of Ryle’s metaphor of mapping the logical geography of a concept. We have done some of this mapping in the previous section. Because the concept ‘education’ is so complex it will be impossible to provide a complete and detailed map. We shall, in the short space and time available, have to be satisfied with the main contours of the map. Stepping now out of the metaphor, we shall have to be satisfied if we are able to provide some key rules for the concept of education, which may be insufficient to provide a complete definition of it. The rules we do isolate, however, will be necessary and they will reflect accurately public usage. Accordingly Peters isolates three central criteria for the use of the term ‘education’. Before we turn to those, it is helpful to mention a few incidental observations connected with the concept ‘education’.
One such observation is that a conceptual analysis of ‘education’ other than Peters’ is very hard to come upon. He himself has noted that ‘when I was working on my Inaugural Lecture on Education as Initiation, (I) was unable to unearth any previous explicit attempt to demarcate the concept of “education”’.1 It is not surprising, then, that Peters has held central stage in philosophy of education since that time. There have, of course, been numerous healthy debates concerning the completeness and accuracy of the analysis but no serious successful challenges to the central claims Peters makes regarding the value and knowledge criteria for ‘education’ as discussed below. But first one or two more incidental observations about education which Peters himself makes.

‘Education’ according to Peters is primarily an ‘achievement’ term. The reference here is to G.Ryle’s distinction between ‘achievement’ (success, or ‘got it’) verbs, which refer to the outcome of an activity, and ‘task’ verbs, which specify activities.2 Thus ‘win’, ‘find’, ‘hear’, ‘arrive’, and ‘cure’ are achievements corresponding respectively to the tasks of ‘run’, ‘seek’, ‘listen’, ‘travel’, and ‘treat’. Achievement terms do not specify an activity; there is nothing you do when you find or arrive in addition to seeking or travelling, and so on. In like manner ‘education’ picks out no activities or processes (or nearly none, see below) like instructing, teaching, going to school, studying, and so on; but rather refers to the state of being for which those processes were outcomes. Strictly speaking it is wrong to say things like, ‘I am educating him’, for there is nothing specifiable that one necessarily does in bringing about education. Teaching is a specifiable activity, but education is not. Education is what results from having engaged in a series of activities which result in a person becoming educated. In Ethics and Education, Peters says that ‘It (education) lays down criteria to which activities or processes must conform’.3 A corollary of this observation is that we do not look for clarification of the concept education to the practices of so-called educational institutions but rather to the characteristics of an educated person. So, as already noted, ‘education’ is primarily an achievement term. Nevertheless, it is not entirely so. There are, as we shall see below, certain restrictions as to what counts as an educational activity, regardless of the worthwhileness of the outcome. Certain kinds of treatments of individuals are morally objectionable no matter how worthy the goal appears to be.

Two other incidental observations about education that Peters makes concern the notions of ‘deliberateness’ and ‘initiation’. Peters talks of education as being a deliberate attempt on the part of someone (often a teacher) to initiate someone else (the student) into a hitherto unknown world of knowledge and understanding and practice (say,
the world of pictorial art, or perhaps geometry). In recent years these two notions have given rise to discussion and controversy. The issue concerning deliberateness is whether or not certain worthwhile achievements in knowledge and understanding that come about non-deliberately, naturally, without effort, that are acquired almost by osmosis by living with those ‘in the know’, that are the result of ‘picking things up’, count as educational achievements. Does, for example, a person’s education really begin in the crib when first distinctions are made and first words learned? Does it continue when one learns naturally to speak truthfully and to regard others? And if so, does that mean that everyone who has the qualities of personhood is therefore partially educated? Or does ‘education’ refer only to those school-like deliberate acts of initiation usually beginning at about age 4 to 6? And is the term initiation crucial in this process? Does ‘initiation’ refer to a particular methodology, that is, a non-rational method of teaching and holding of beliefs? And, does Peters’ use of the phrase ‘education as initiation’ suggest such a methodology? Or is the term ‘initiation’ a relatively neutral term with respect to methodology? And could the term ‘initiation’ without shift in Peters’ analysis have been replaced with a term such as ‘introduction to’ or ‘familiarization with’ or ‘understanding and acceptance of, and so on? Some, for example, have argued that Peters makes room for the process of indoctrination in education because of his use of the word ‘initiation’. Others have argued that Peters’ use of that term is an error precisely because it leads one to such conclusions. The position taken here is that the term ‘initiation’ is relatively neutral and is of little consequence in Peters’ scheme of things. For Peters the central features of education are the criterial attributes of (1) value and (2) knowledge. In addition there is (3) a procedural requirement. These three criteria for education are at the core of his analysis. Once the full force of these three criteria is grasped, it becomes apparent that it is of minor consequence whether the process is deliberate or not or whether the process is or is not characterized as initiation. To that core analysis we now turn.

The Value (Desirability) Criterion

Education, in the more differentiated sense of E₃ explored above, is not value-neutral according to Peters. Acquiring education is acquiring something worthwhile and desirable. In *Ethics and Education*, Peters writes: ‘It would be a logical contradiction to say that a man had been educated but that he had in no way changed for the better’. In this regard, education is like the concept ‘reform’. To say that a person is reformed is to say that he has become better, *by definition*. This is a logical feature of the concept. By itself this feature does not determine
which particulars are the things of value anymore than the concept ‘reform’ tells us which particulars make people morally better. It is a separate and uniquely difficult task to argue and support claimed about which things are valuable in education. All that is being claimed so far is that one cannot in education avoid making value judgments.

Some educationists maintain that by appealing to children’s needs or interests or society’s needs or by recognizing developmental patterns in children or growth tendencies one can escape the awesome task of making judgments about what is educationally good or worthwhile or valuable. The escape, as we shall see again and again, is impossible. One does willy-nilly make value choices in education. One can of course be trained to do undesirable things such as lock-picking and smuggling. But to be ‘educated in smuggling’ is logically impossible unless one deems the skill of smuggling desirable and it is desirable, which would then have to be shown. Nor can one logically claim that ‘all that education didn’t do me much good’, at least not in the E₃ sense of education. It is of course possible to say sensibly that ‘all that schooling didn’t do me much good’ and the reasons probably would be because it didn’t provide me with an education. But that would only underline the fact that education is the achievement of something of value.

Moreover, the something of value that is achieved in education is intrinsically valuable. Education is not merely a tool or instrument to do things with, such as to succeed in getting a job or provide one with a skill to obtain extrinsic ends. Education is valuable in itself and for its own sake. The knowledge and understanding obtained become features of one’s person and shape one’s sense of what is of ultimate value. Education, while it does also contribute to the means of achieving certain ends, is primarily concerned with the provision of worthwhile ends or goals of life. It is in that sense non-instrumental. Thus education is very much concerned with the ethical questions associated with the good life, as we shall see further in Chapter 10 on the question of the justification of education.

But a caution is in order. Some people, agreeing that education is through and through a values enterprise, have drawn the false conclusion that if education implies value, then value implies education. But, of course, A implies B does not imply that B implies A. Not everything of value is educational. Eating, relaxing, and playing games may all be valuable, even intrinsically valuable, but they are not educational. Educational value is to be found only within a limited, specifiable range of valuable achievements; and that range is limited by the second criterion discussed below. A great deal of nonsense is asserted about education when the several criteria of education are not taken together, when, that is, a single necessary criterion is taken in
isolation and considered to be sufficient. Thus teachers or ‘educational leaders’ sometimes argue that certain socially valuable activities (e.g., skiing, swimming, dancing, socializing, playing games, etc.) are educational and so should be pursued in public educational institutions because they are valuable for the young people to have, forgetting that any activity that is educational must also fulfill the procedural requirements of the third criterion (discussed below) but particularly also the cognitive requirements of the knowledge criterion.

The Knowledge Criterion

The fact that educated people are knowledgeable is not merely an interesting observation about some people; it is a definitional truth. If someone attempted to display to you an educated person who knew next to nothing, you would not marvel at the curious finding but charge him with failure to make sense, with failure to understand language. Education without knowledge is logically impossible. That much seems undisputable and straightforward. But the questions of how much and what kinds of knowledge are required for education engender considerable dispute and raise complex issues. Peters’ claim is that education requires knowledge in breadth and depth in a manner commanding our commitment and concern. We shall look at these claims in turn, for the knowledge criterion is clearly central in any analysis of education and the key to understanding Peters’ analysis.

Breadth

How much must a person know to be considered educated? There can only be a vague answer to this question, for there exist no clear criteria for determining this. It is better to think of education as an ideal which no one can fully achieve, since no one can know everything. On the other end of the continuum it is clear that very few normal people know nothing. So almost everyone is partially educated since we all have some knowledge. Nevertheless we do talk about educated and uneducated people and mean something by this. So if one insists on pressing the point and demanding an answer, the best that can be done is point to a relatively arbitrary norm for a particular society representing an average achievement in knowledge below which people would be considered uneducated and above which, educated. But that question is relatively unimportant in the breadth issue. What is crucial is the spread in types of knowledge. An educated person is one who has mastered a wide range of types of knowledge. The more narrow the focus in knowledge the more we are inclined to withhold
the appellation ‘educated’. A scientist who knew everything about quasars but nothing about aesthetics, history, or ethics—were that possible—would not win a citation for being educated, no matter how well-trained he was. The minimum breadth requirement is comprehension of and familiarization with all the logical types of knowledge—those ‘forms of knowledge and understanding’ discussed in Chapter 5, namely, logic, empirical science, human science, aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy (and perhaps religion). An education omitting any one of these ‘forms’ is deficient. Narrowness and education are antithetical. The point can be made even more strikingly by contrasting education with training.

One of the key ideas in understanding the notion ‘training’ is narrowness of focus. This narrowness is related both to the simple nature of the achievement and to the paucity of rational understanding and cognitive implications required for mastery. Usually training refers to those activities in education which are instrumental in the achievement of major educational goals. We are trained in reading and times tables, in sharpening pencils and tying shoelaces, in handling scientific experimental equipment and in pole vaulting. But we become educated persons by mastering understanding of science and literature, of aesthetic form and body functions. The commonplace distinction between physical training and physical education illustrates the above-noted contrasting features. Even more dramatic is the distinction between sex education and sex training. Very few devotees of sex education, which suggests wide understanding of the complex problems surrounding that subject, are advocates of sex training, which suggests narrowly defined skills with minimum cognition.

The breadth requirement for education also answers to the frequent demand for wholeness in education. Educating the whole child is a conceptual truth about education; it is not an option which only some schools, for example, the Waldorf schools, subscribe to. And the wholeness relates not only to breadth of knowledge and cognitive content but also to feeling and emotion. As we shall see further below (in ‘Intellectualism’), educational achievement is not merely cold intellectual understanding but an acquisition of corresponding appropriate emotions and attitudes. Such change in emotions and attitude come about because the depth requirement for knowledge has also been satisfied.

Depth

The educated person has more than superficial acquaintance with many free-floating bits of knowledge. Peters often speaks of knowledge together with understanding as a single requirement for
education. There is a reason for this. As an analysis of knowledge shows (see ‘The Nature of Knowledge’ in Chapter 5), knowledge is justified, true belief; and without grasping (or understanding) the justification for belief there can be no genuine knowledge. It is this understanding that gives depth to the whole enterprise of knowledge acquisition in education. This is why Peters writes of the educated person as one who sees the ‘reason why’ of things and approaches knowledge from the ‘inside of a way of thought’; he has grasped the principles for organizing facts and the conceptual schemes which give coherence to otherwise disjointed ‘inert’ knowledge. Depth and breadth ultimately complement each other and give one ‘cognitive perspective’, and ability to see connections between various forms of knowledge and how they play a part in a unified and coherent way of life. Thus for the educated person knowledge has direct impact on one’s attitude and direction in life. It transforms one’s outlook and adds dimensions to one’s person. And since knowledge plays such an important role in life one becomes committed to the pursuit of truth, caring about detail and evidence with a keenness not characteristic of the uneducated. Such concern for evidence is also characteristic of the manner in which education is brought about.

The Procedural Criterion

As noted in the section on ‘Preliminary observations’, education is primarily an achievement term. The value and knowledge criteria discussed above represent that achievement. There is, however, a task aspect to education as well. This task aspect relates to the appropriateness of the procedures for bringing about education. According to Peters the procedures (various kinds of activities such as teaching, instructing, or attending school) must be consistent with the ends to be achieved. Such activities, or processes, are legion; one cannot name them all. Almost anything will count as an educational procedure as long as two conditions are met: (1) the procedure must result in an educationally valuable achievement, and (2) the manner of proceeding must not infringe upon the wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner or achiever. This second condition does not rule out compulsion, commanding, coercion and the like (if for good reasons they are justified), for the learner in these instances still has a choice and can resist instruction. However, if methods such as conditioning, indoctrinating, and brain washing and the like are employed, then the learner cannot resist. These are ruled out on moral grounds, according to Peters, and do not count as educational procedures. So this third criterion is a negative one; it does
not tell us in any specific ways what is required as a procedure for education but tells us only what is not permitted.

If we now put the three criteria for education together we can construct a rough definition for education as follows: education is the achievement of a desirable state of mind characterized by knowledge and understanding in breadth and depth with cognitive perspective and by corresponding appropriate emotions and attitudes, these brought about, deliberately, in a manner not to infringe upon the voluntariness and wittingness on the part of the learner. The above, allowing for error and misconstrual of interpretation, is the analysis that Peters gives. It has withstood severe and multifold criticism and can, with only minor adjustment, be considered acceptable. Some of the criticism that has been levied can be usefully discussed to gain further insight into the concept.

Critical Remarks on Peters’ Analysis

Necessity of the Three Conditions

In The Logic of Education, Peters himself, with Hirst, considers whether the desirability condition for education can be dropped. He considers counter-examples in which people use the term ‘education’ as though it is a bad state to be in. These people consider it bad because they equate ‘education’ with books and theories and what goes on in schools and universities. They have the E2 sense of education discussed above. And because what the books and theories provide is thought of as either a waste of time or undermining favourite doctrines and practices of their particular cultural tradition, ‘education’ is thought of as bad. There is then a use of ‘education’ in which the desirability condition is absent. But of course, as Peters and Hirst show, and as also argued here, that is not a genuine counter example, for the desirability condition applies only to the E3 sense, the differentiated and more precise sense of education. In that differentiated sense the desirability condition is a necessary one. And this can be maintained even if it is granted that in the E2 schooling sense it is correct to remark that the education (i.e., schooling) was a bad experience.

One objection not dealt with there, nor apparently anywhere, is the possible redundancy of the third, procedural condition. It will be recalled that the third condition is the one that rules out as education any procedures such as conditioning and indoctrination on the grounds that they infringe upon the voluntariness on the part of the learner and are thus ruled out on moral grounds. It will here be argued that such a move is redundant since such procedures are already ruled
out on logical grounds required by the knowledge condition. It is
doubtful that conditioning is always immoral. Acquiring toilet habits
through a process of conditioning in early childhood surely is an
acceptable and desirable practice. It is not immoral. But then it is also
not considered education in the E₃ sense because of the absence of
understanding and reasoned justification, as required by the
knowledge condition. Now if education requires knowledge, not
merely skill; and if knowledge is having beliefs which are true and
which are justified by good reasons and evidence and recognized so
to be justified; then it could never be the case that such beliefs could
ever be acquired through a process of conditioning or brain washing
or indoctrination, for these procedures never can in principle permit
such cognition and understanding. If such understanding of the
evidence does occur it is a sure sign that conditioning, and so on, did
not. So the nefarious procedures are already ruled out by the strict
requirements of the knowledge condition; and so the third criterion is
strictly speaking redundant. It may, however, also be the case that
certain forms of conditioning and other procedures such as
indoctrination are immoral for other reasons. For these other reasons
and for convenience we shall continue to make reference to the third,
procedural condition, even if only for sake of emphasis.

Intellectualism

Another form of criticism brought against Peters is that his analysis
fails to take into account those elements of education concerning
emotional development. The analysis, it is thought, is too intellectual,
emphasizing as it does the cognitive components of education at the
expense of development of the whole child. This charge, however,
really rests on failure fully to understand Peters’ position. As already
alluded to in the section on ‘Breadth’, there is ample scope and demand
for emotional development occurring concurrently with cognitive
development. It is in fact part of Peters’ broader educational theory
that the two cannot be separated. In Ethics and Education Peters argues
that emotions are not self-subsistent entities cut adrift from cognitions.
Emotions have a cognitive core; and depending on how we appraise
certain situations (e.g., snakes are dangerous) we do or do not feel fear
or anxiety. There is, in other words, always a cognitive aspect to
emotions and an emotive aspect to cognitions. We do not, for example,
study the cognitive elements of a poem on one day and the emotional
elements of it on the next. To have understood the poem is at the same
time to have been able to respond to it emotionally in the appropriate
way. So when education emphasizes cognition it is not omitting the
emotive and feeling side of human beings. Development of feeling and
attitude is part and parcel of development of knowledge and understanding.

Elitism

Closely related to the above criticism of ‘intellectualism’ is the alleged ‘elitism’ in a form of education that emphasizes knowledge in breadth and depth, particularly theoretical knowledge as required by the justification condition of knowledge. Apparently some people hold and argue that an education that emphasizes knowledge in breadth and depth favors certain children (the brighter ones) and certain segments of society (the professions), in which many bright people work. It is thought that there is a basic injustice in a system which allows some children to perform better than others. To correct the injustice it is advocated that certain children should be permitted to spend a fair portion of their time in school (and the slowest, almost all of their time) in pursuit for practical skills for employment and leisure, while the brighter youngsters only are left to pursue primarily ‘academic’ knowledge. In this way everyone has an opportunity to ‘succeed’ in school and thus the basic injustice is remedied.

Now if this argument is difficult to understand it is because it doesn’t make much sense. If there is an injustice here, it is certainly not of man’s making; rather it might be considered some sort of cosmic injustice about which we can do very little. It just is the case that some children perform better than others in any given area of human endeavour. The random distribution of talent at birth is a given and it is impossible to engineer equal achievement. Achieving equal amounts of different things does not represent removal of injustice any more than does achieving different amounts of the same thing. To say $a$ achieves the same amount of $x$ as $b$ achieves of $y$ is not to say that $a$ and $b$ have something of equal value. If it is education that is of such supreme value, it cannot be replaced with something else, training, for example, and the outcome deemed of equal value and equal achievement. Just because some people because of innate capabilities achieve more education than others with lesser capability, it does not follow that the latter should be cheated of what is after all of the highest value. Are those who would argue otherwise prepared to condemn large segments of our population to ignorance and cultural deprivation? If so, that would indeed be an unjustifiable inequality of educational opportunity. Inequality is not inherent in a concept of education which emphasizes knowledge and understanding as intrinsically valuable for everybody.

Because education is so valuable for everybody, education should be the central concern of the school. That does not mean that schools
could not also be concerned with other matters. What the school’s role in society is, however, must not be confused with what the role of education is in a person’s life and in the community. To these issues, often referred to as the aims of education, we turn next.

**Recommended further readings:**


**Notes**


**Questions and Exercises**

R.S. Peters states that education ‘picks out no particular activity or process. Rather it lays down criteria to which activities or processes must conform’ (*Ethics and Education*, p. 25). Briefly summarize the three criteria made explicit by Peters. How adequate are they for the notion of ‘general liberal education’? Are there uses of ‘education’ to which these criteria do not apply?

**Provide brief answers to the following questions:**

1. What does it mean to say that education is an ‘achievement term’?
2. How would you differentiate between ‘training’ and ‘education’? Is it possible to train and educate simultaneously? Explain, giving examples.
3. In what ways is the concept ‘education’ like the concept ‘reform’?
4. Are there senses in which ‘education’ is a neutral term?
5. Are there any limits as to what counts as an educational task?
6 Learning to ski may be valuable, even intrinsically valuable. Is it therefore necessarily educational? Could it be educational? Explain.
7 Is Peters’ ‘procedural’ criterion for education redundant? Explain.

**What would be wrong with saying the following:**

1 ‘He should know better, for I was educating him all day.’
2 ‘She is educated, but it hasn’t done her much good.’
3 ‘I hope to get my education while under hypnosis.’
4 ‘During my education I was conditioned to believe that the army had better food than the civilians during the Great War.’